This paper discusses regional development patterns in China, and examines effective ways of using development aid to attain regional balanced growth through optimizing growth spillover effects.
regions, this paper addresses the following questions: 1. Does the rapid take-off of the coastal province greatly encourage the growth of the entire Chinese economy, and which provinces benefit most from the growth spillover effects of the coastal provinces? 2. If the objective is to achieve regional balanced growth, which provinces should be prioritized in spurring growth to maximize the spillover effects in favor of the inland/western provinces?
As argued in Courcie and Lafay (1972) , demand from partner economies plays an important role in local development. The input-output linkages lead to non-negligible interregional spillover effects. Impacts of satisfactory performance of one province on the others could be positive or negative: on the one hand, it may enlarge the market and stimulate capital/knowledge transfer in favor of its neighbors (positive spillover effects); on the other hand, it may empty its surroundings of economic activities through its strengthened competitiveness in product and labor markets (negative shadow effects).
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The rapid growth of a rich province may pull its poor neighbors through the channels of capital and technology transfer; and the rapid growth of a poor province may push its rich neighbors through material supply.
Given that economic interdependence between two provinces weakens as geographic distance increases (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Eaton and Kortum, 1994) , and given the significant border effect (Amiti and Javorcik, 2004; McCallum, 1995; Poncet, 2002) , other things equal, we focus on studying the spillover/shadow effects between neighbor provinces that share common borders. Many studies on spillover effects focus on foreign direct investments or some specific sectors 2 . We examine the general growth spillover effect by studying the effect of economic performance of neighbor provinces on local growth. 3 To capture the impact of the economic performance of a province on the others, which depends on the economic size of the provinces in question and the 1 See Krugman (1993a; 1993b) for more discussion. 2 See, for example, Zhang and Felminghan (2002) , Chuang and Hsu (2004) , Berthelemy and Demurger (2000) , and Yilmaz et al. (2002) . 3 See, for example, Moreno and Trehan (1997) and Easterly and Levine (1995) . The former argue that an economy's growth rate is positively influenced by the growth rate of the economies nearby, after controlling a set of variables commonly used to predict growth rates. The latter confirm a large growth spillover effect in a study of the growth experience of Africa.
economic interdependence between them, we construct a series of indicators to measure the economic environment that a province faces.
Using panel provincial data from 1978 to 1999, this paper studies the spillover effects in the case of China, and came out with three findings: (1) at national and regional levels, the rapid growth of a province encourages that of the neighbors -the regional development is in a virtuous circle; 4 (2) spillover effects differ in size and in significance among different province groups -some coastal provinces serve as growth locomotives; and (3) the rapid take-off of some coastal provinces in the last two decades did maximize aggregate growth of the entire economy, while encouraging growth in the inland hubs that have strong forward/backward linkages with other provinces is the most effective way of reducing the regional development gap.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 describes the growth trajectories and the center-peripheral regional growth pattern between coastal and inland provinces; section 2 focuses on the construction of a series of indicators of "neighbor performance"; section 3 examines the differentiated spillover effects on local growth issued from and received by different provinces; section 4 simulates the impact of a hypothetical performance enhancement of various provinces on regional growth, examines the effectiveness of the regional growth pattern, and identifies the target locations of development aid. Finally, the paper concludes.
Section 1: Center-peripheral unbalanced regional growth pattern
The success of the Chinese economic reforms, which were launched in the late 1970s, is well documented in the literature. 5 Through incrementally reforming the centrally planned system to improve incentives and increase the scope of the market in resource allocation, and through building new institutions to support a market system before old institutions were destroyed, China's transition has achieved a remarkable success (Qian, 2000; . The GDP per capita of the Chinese provinces increased more than 5 times in average from 1978 to 1999 (table 1). yr , is superior to 1, the development level of province i is higher than the national average in year t ; if t i yr , is inferior to 1, the development level of province i is lower than the national average in year t . Normalizing the GDP per capita of province i by the average national GDP per capita, we find that the three municipalities always have a much higher relative development level than the other provinces -Tianjin's development level is at least 2.5 times the national average, Beijing around 3 times, and Shanghai around 6 times. Given their special characteristics (such as high urbanization rates, special economic policies, etc.), we separate these provinces from the other provinces as they are considered the richest group.
Using Epanechnikov Kernel density 8 , graph 1 describes the growth trajectories of the Chinese provinces, where the width of the arrows in the graph is proportional to the number of the provinces that follow the particular development trajectory (the change in Guangdong, Hainan; the central region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Nei Mongol, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi; the western region includes Guangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xizang. The central region and the western region are considered as the inland regions. See annex 1 for more details. 7 Despite the rapid absolute growth compared with most economies worldwide, the inland provinces suffered a relative decline in the Chinese economy. 8 The estimation of Kernel density of a series X in point x is defined as the others concentrate in the other extreme, the regional development is unequal. 10 Our results show that, apart from the three municipalities, in early 1980s, the relative development levels of the provinces tended to cluster around the national average, few provinces were much poorer or richer than the others -apart from the three provinces (Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Heilongjiang) that had a relative GDP per capital ratio higher than 1.3, all the other 22 provinces clustered together with the peak value around 1 (ie.
around the national average level); however, in the late 1990s, the number of provinces whose development level is around the national average shrank to 7, the poor group emerged -14 provinces clustered together with a peak value of 0.65, and the number of the provinces belonging to the rich group slightly increased to 4.
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The graph 1 shows that (i) at the end of our period of study, all provinces belonging to the poor group were inland provinces (predominantly western provinces);
and all provinces belonging to the rich group were costal provinces 12 ; and (ii) during this period, all provinces that suffered a relative decline in ranking were inland provinces (predominantly western provinces), and all the provinces that caught up were coastal provinces. The Chinese provinces converged to different clubs -the coastal provinces clustered together to form the rich club, while the inland provinces declined to the level of periphery. The emergence of the two peaks, rich and poor (consisting of the coastal provinces and the remote inland provinces, respectively), vividly demonstrates the centerperipheral development pattern in China.
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9 For the sake of simplicity and to smooth out the impact of short-term shocks, we examine the distribution of the provincial average relative GDP per capita of the first and the last seven years of our period of study (1978-1984 and 1992-1999) . The evolution of annual relative provincial GDP per capita, 1978 GDP per capita, -1999 , is available from the author upon request. 10 See Ben-David (1994; , Quah (1996; , Cozzi (1997) . 11 Here, the groups (rich, intermediate, and poor) are classified in order to maximize the homogeneity of the relative GDP per capita level among the members in the same group, and the heterogeneity among members in different groups. 12 The three municipalities are already separated as the richest group from the other provinces. For the reasons of readability, we do not illustrate these three provinces in graph 1. 13 See Quah (1997; , Desdoigts (1999) .
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To measure the influence that one province may receive from its partners, in other words, the general growth spillover/shadow effects that the immediate neighbor have on the performance of the province in question, we construct our indicator "neighbor performance", noted t i GAW , , which is the weighted average of the growth rate of the neighbor provinces. The gravity model suggests that the farther away two economies are, the weaker their relationship is, others characteristics being equal.
14 In this analysis, the neighbor provinces are limited to the ones that share common borders with the province in question. province of i . In our case, i m is an integer between 2 and 8. 16 Here, the value of
is conditioned on the growth rate of the neighbor provinces q , t q ga , . The influence of the 14 See, for example, Evenett and Keller (1998), Bergstrand (1985) , and Deardorff (1995) . 15 For the sake of simplicity, we limit the "neighbors" as the provinces that share common borders, and do not take into account the linkages through inland waterway. Addressing the second round spillover effects and examining the impacts of inter-provincial migration structure on regional growth will be an interesting topic for further research. 16 For example, Shanghai has only 2 neighbors (Zhejiang and Jiangsu); while, Sichuan has 8 neighbors (Gansu, Qinghai, Xizang, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, and Shaanxi). growth rate of each neighbor province q is conditioned on its economic size of relative to all the i m provinces surrounding province i .
Spillover effects may vary in direction (positive/negative) and in size across different types of provinces, for example, it is probable that spillover effects from a poor inland neighbor and those from a rich coastal neighbor differ. In order to relax the hypothesis of the homogeneity of the spillover effects issued from (and received by) different provinces 17 , we classify neighbor provinces into different sub-groups according to two criteria: "criterion of richness" (whether a neighbor province is richer or poorer than the province in question) 18 ; and "criterion of geographic region" (whether a neighbor province locates in the same geographic region of the province in questioncoastal/inland, or coastal/central/western).
According to the first criterion, we have two sub-categories of GAW indicators for a province i :
, for neighbor provinces richer than the province i ; and
, for neighbor provinces poorer than the province i . 19 Similarly, according to the second criterion, we have another two sub-categories of GAW indicators:
GAWM , for neighbor provinces that 17 Also, it increases the homogeneity of the neighbor provinces q inside the subgroup, and better allows for the across-subgroup heterogeneity.
18 If the GDP per capita of a neighbor province q in year 1 − t is higher than that of the province i , we consider province q as a neighbor province that is richer than province i when we construct the indicator i GAW at time t . Note that a neighbor province q could be richer than province i at time t , but poorer than province i at time s t + , where 0 ≠ s , due to the change of the relative rankings of different provinces. 
Section 3: Spillover effects and regional growth
In this section, we examine the spillover effects on regional growth by integrating the "neighbor performance" into the Solow-type growth model 22 using the panel data at Barro (1991) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) . 23 See Annex 2 for the construction of the indicator "peripheral degree", and see Luo (2001; 2004) Note: t-students are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent ; ** significant at 5 percent ; *** significant at 1 percent. 24 The limited number of observations does not allow carrying out the SURE estimations. The results of the two-step GMM estimations with two year-lagged dependent variables as IV matrix do not suggest the superiority of the GMM estimations over the fixed-effects estimations. 25 We have also introduced year dummies to capture the effects of the common shocks that affect the growth performance of all provinces. For the sake of simplicity, the estimations of the dummies are not shown in the tables. 26 Here, the role of investment on regional growth is not significant. Following the Solow growth theory, we do not drop this variable from the estimations.
To capture the role that "economic environment" plays on growth, we introduce the indicator "neighbor performance" to equation 2. In order to minimize the problem of endogeneity and to take into account the delay of the effect of an increase in demand on growth, we use the lagged value of GAW , noted GAWL , where
The significant positive role of GAWL shows that, after controlling for the impacts of the other determinants of regional growth, the better the performance of the neighbour provinces, the higher the local growth rate.
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However, the similarity of spillover effects from and to different provinces seems to be a discussable hypothesis -for example, the spillover effects generated by a rich province on a poor neighbour may be different from those generated by a poor province on a rich neighbour. We examine the spillover effects from neighbour provinces richer than the province in question and those from neighbour provinces poorer than the province in question separately by introducing The results of equations 3 and 4 suggest that the growth of the poorer provinces offers "push forces" to the neighbor provinces that are relatively richer, and the growth of the richer provinces offers "pull forces" to the neighbor provinces that are relatively 27 We have estimated the spillover effects of the series of the indicators "neighbor performance" using the growth model without controlling the four growth determinants. The significance and the value of the coefficients of the indicators, so-called "gross spillover effects", are highly consistent with the ones estimated after controlling the growth determinants, the "net spillover effects". It suggests that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the other growth determinants. The results are available upon request. However, the refining of the classification of neighbor provinces into homogenous sub-groups leads to the shrinkage of the sample size -some provinces are eliminated from particular subgroups because of their specific characteristics regarding the classification criteria.
28 Equation 3' (4') confirms that regarding the role of the independent variables, the sub-samples are not significantly different from the wholesample, and the sub-samples are not significantly different between themselves. 29 In other words, the spillover effects that our indicator "neighbor performance" captures are not sensitive to the sample modifications.
Given the significant role that geographic position plays on regional growth (Krugman 1991; 1998; Fujita et al. 1999 2 shows that, the growth of the neighbor coastal provinces encourages that of the coastal provinces in question 31 . However, the spillover effects are mainly the "pushing effects" from the neighbor provinces that are poorer than the province in question (equation 4) 32 , 28 For example, the richest provinces do not have neighbor provinces that are richer than themselves, and the poorest provinces do not have neighbor provinces which are poorer than themselves. 29 The results of t-test suggest that the coefficients of the four growth determinants in equation 3' (4') are not significantly different from those in equation 3 (4). 30 Equation 1 serves as the baseline comparison. 31 Here, the effects of peripheral degree on growth are convex, as suggested in Luo (2004) . In other words, the remoteness to economic centers plays a negative role on regional growth, while such negative effects decrease as peripheral degree increases. y DP in our estimation for coastal provinces. Conclusion does not change much if we drop these two terms and use the equation for the whole nation to estimate the case of coastal region. 32 The similarity of the size and sign of the coefficients of the controlling variables in our equations of interest (equations 2, 3, 4 and 5) and in the baseline equations (equations 2', 3', 4' and 5') supports the robustness of our results.
while the development of the rich coastal provinces does not have significant "pulling effect". The existence of the "pushing effect" and the absence of the "pulling effect" suggest that the most advanced coastal centers tend to polarize. Equation 5 shows that the growth of the neighbor inland provinces does not significantly push the further development of the coastal neighbors. Table 4 shows that the development of the inland neighbors and coastal neighbors both significantly encourages the development of the inland provinces. Given that the central provinces are richer than the western provinces as a whole, we classify the subgroup of inland provinces according to geographic position (central/western). Table 5 shows that among the central provinces, the development of one province encourages that of the others. In particular, the "pushing effects" of the central provinces that are relatively less advanced on the ones that are more advanced are more significant than "pulling effect" from the reversed direction. Many of the central provinces that are relatively more advanced are neighbors of coastal provinces. The "pushing effects" and "pulling effects" that they benefit from both directions encourage their rapid development, which may favor their catching-up vis-à-vis the coastal neighbors and their "standing-out" vis-à-vis the other inland provinces. The western provinces benefit from the growth of the central neighbors. However, the spillover effects of the western provinces on the growth of their central neighbors are not significant. t-students are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent ; ** significant at 5 percent ; *** significant at 1 percent.
The significance of the positive spillover effects holds for the Chinese provinces as a whole, as well as for the different sub-groups. However, some provinces have more significant spillover effects on the others. In this case, the relatively less advanced coastal provinces act as "locomotives" that pull and push the development of their neighbors. Some provinces benefit from the spillover effects disproportionately, for example, the relatively more developed central provinces enjoy the pushing and pulling effects from their neighbors. In this regard, the polarization of the most developed coastal provinces and the catching-up of the relatively rich central provinces could be expected due to the strong spillover effects that they enjoy. Note: t-students are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent ; ** significant at 5 percent ; *** significant at 1 percent. (a) CE stands for Central provinces; (b) WE stands for Western provinces.
Section 4: Provincial growth spillover effects simulation
Spillover effects from and onto a province differ. We will examine the effect of growth of different provinces on regional development by simulating a hypothetical performance enhancement.
By construction, the change in the growth rate of the province q ( . Given the fact that the economic environment plays a significant role in regional growth, the modification of the indicator
will result in a modification of performance of neighbor provinces i . The greater the relative economic size of province q , the larger the induced effects on the performance of province i , others being equal. By simulating the spillover effects of each province q on different neighbor provinces and regrouping the latter into geographic regions, we can examine the effectiveness of the regional growth pattern, and identify the provinces that serve as "locomotives" (which have the strongest positive spillover effects on the neighbors) for the development of China as a whole, and of the coastal provinces, the inland provinces, and the western provinces in particular.
To capture the heterogeneity of the spillover effects from and on coastal/inland provinces, we sub-classify the indicators GAWL according to the geographic position of the each province and its neighbours to simulate the impacts of a 10% hypothetical increase in the growth rate of each province q . 34 Here, the type of indicator "neighbor performance", noted as t i GAWX , , is conditioned on the geographic position of the province that generates the spillover effects and that of the province that receives the spillover effects. X is specified by two codes: " CO " or " IN ", and " M " or " F " --the coding " CO " or " IN " depends on the geographic position of the recipient province; while the coding " M " or " F " depends on the whether province that generates the spillover effect is in the same geographic region of the recipient. For example, when we simulate the impact of a 10% hypothetical increase in the growth rate of Hebei (a coastal province) on Henan (an inland province), we use , which stands for the increase of the growth rate of province i in time t induced by the 10% enhancement of the growth rate of province q in time 1 − t . 35 We tried more detail "sub-grouping" of the provinces groups into central and western, and sub-classify provinces according to their relative richness level. It is in fact a trade-off between imposing the "hypothesis of the similarity of spillover effects from and on different provinces" and losing number of observations (because not all provinces have all types of neighbour provinces, when we increase the homogeneity of provinces, spillover generator and recipient, we get small samples). We believe that the coastal/inland sub-grouping is the optimal one which best respects the heterogeneity of the spillover effects among different groups without losing too many observations. Results of other sub-grouping are available upon request.
Fifth, we calculate the weighted average of the spillover effects on the provinces i to examine the effects induced by the change of t q ga , on different geographic groups.
We weigh the spillover effects of each province i by its relative economic size in the group, and note the spillover effects of province q on the region in question in time For the sake of simplicity, we study the average induced effects during the period 1980-1999 by calculating the following variables respectively 36 : 36 We suppose that the "induced effects" of the hypothetical growth enhancement of the province q on itself are zero, when we calculate the spillover effects of the group that the province q belongs to. The higher the value of the series of the indicators m q gaeffw ) ( , the greater the spillover effects of province q on the group of provinces in question.
The column "national" in table 6 shows that a hypothetical 10% increase in the growth rate of some coastal provinces, including Hebei, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian and Zhejiang leads to the greatest performance increase at the national level.
These six provinces are among those that experienced the fastest growth since 1978. 37 In this regard, their rapid take-off, which leads to the largest aggregate growth spillover effects on the entire economy, can be considered as a regional development pattern that maximize national growth. In particular, the fast growth of Guangdong has been strongly favouring its inland neighbours.
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results of the induced effects of each province q on the performance of different groups (all Chinese provinces, coastal provinces, inland provinces and western provinces) in each year are available upon request. 37 Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shandong are the five provinces that grew fastest, with an average annual growth rate higher than 10% for the whole period of 1978-1999 (table 1) . 38 Our simulation results are robust to the modification of the hypothetical growth enhancement. Annex 3 shows that the rankings of the size of the spillover effects that different provinces have on the whole China and on each region do not change much if we do not distinguish the spillover effects from and to coastal and inland provinces but simply use the equation 2 of table 2 to simulate the spillover effects for all countries. We have also tested the robustness of the ranking by simulating the effects if the growth rate of each province increases 10% of the national level (in this case, the absolute hypothetical growth enhancement of each province is the same, no matter the province in question had a high growth rate or low growth rate). In this case, the ranking does not change much either. Results are available upon request.
However, if we look closely into the distribution of these positive spillover effects from the coastal locomotives at regional level, the results of the last three columns suggest that the induced growth mainly concentrates in the coastal region and their effects on the inland region (and western region) are very limited. The resulting widening regional development gap is inconsistent with the objective of balanced growth. To generate the optimal spillover effects on the catching-up of the inland/western provinces, development aid should be targeted towards the inland hubs, Hubei and Sichuan, for their rapid growth might not only has large spillover effects on the inland/western regions, but also on the entire Chinese economy. 
Conclusions
The rapid take-off of some coastal provinces since the beginning of the economic reforms generated the largest aggregate growth spillover effects on the entire Chinese economy, but at the expense of a widening regional development gap. This paper argues that a policy of encouraging the growth of the non-coastal regional hubs, such as Sichuan and Hubei, would have strong forward and backward linkages with the inland/western regions and thus reduce the regional development gap without sacrificing much aggregate growth.
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